LowonganProfessional Translator-HIGH SPEED RAILWAY CONTRACTOR CONSORTIUM . Professional Translator-HIGH SPEED RAILWAY CONTRACTOR CONSORTIUM Bekasi (Jawa Barat) - M Gold | Ditayangkan: 16-August-2019 | Tutup pada 15-September-2019. Power Construction Corporation of China (POWERCHINA) is a wholly China State-owned company founded on Sept 29, 2011. SemuaKarir dan Lowongan di HIGH SPEED RAILWAY CONTRACTOR CONSORTIUM 13; Lowongan Jurnalis/Editor; Semua Lowongan; English Translator. Gaji: 6.000.000 - 10.000.000 IDR . HIGH SPEED RAILWAY CONTRACTOR CONSORTIUM 13 Jawa Barat . Ditayangkan 6 Mei 2022 . Deskripsi Pekerjaan . 1. TheSOEs are being led by PT Wijaya Karya Tbk to develop the high-speed rail project. The Indonesian consortium comprises PT Wijaya Karya, a construction company, railway operator PT Kereta Api Indonesia, toll-road builder PT Jasa Marga, and PT Perkebunan Nusantara VIII, a plantation company. Benefits of Jakarta to Bandung high-speed rail On30 July 2019, IKM has been successfully awarded by HSRCC (HighSpeed Railway Contractor Consortium) for the most remarkable commercial project located in Bandung area : Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Rail. IKM's contractual scope includes the whole EPC works for HSRCC headquarter base camp, steel structure workshop, landscape etc. Shopa wide range of playsuits jumpsuits products and more at our online shop today. Eligible for free shipping. Categories KantorPemasaran. Jl. P Jayakarta 117, Blok B 52-54, Jakarta 10730. Phone: 6009087, Fax: 6018992 . Processing Factory. Jl. Raya Kosambi Curug km2, Walahar, Klari Indonesias and Southeast Asia's first high-speed rail project is expected to connect the country's largest cities of Jakarta and Bandung, the capital of West Java, covering a distance approaching 142.3 kilometres. As of March 2021, PT KCIC stated that the construction of the Jakarta-Bandung High Speed Rail has reached 70 percent and is expected to be completed by the end of 2022. No trains can run until track construction is completed. Plans and studies have been in the works for high-speed rai Egyptbased contractor Orascom Construction and its consortium partners Siemens Mobility and The Arab Contractors have signed a contract with the National Authority for Tunnels (NAT) to expand the network of Egypt's new high-speed rail system to 2,000 kilometres.. The consortium had signed the first phase of the network covering a 660km line in September 2021. Newjobs for high speed railway contractor consortium 13 in Indonesia available today on JobStreet - Quality Candidates, Quality Employers Lowongankerja High Speed Railway Contractor Consortium Tipar, Jakarta Saring. Kembali. Nama pekerjaan. Di mana. Kembali Filter Hapus. Sortir berdasarkan Relevansi Tanggal Tipe pekerjaan Semua tipe Purna Waktu Tanggal ditayangkan Kapan saja 30 hari terakhir. Jarak. 10km. Cari. Saring. Lamar sekarang. Sortir berdasarkan. Relevansi. Tanggal. ovXD. This article has been translated by PwC Indonesia as part of our Indonesia Infrastructure News Service. PwC Indonesia has not checked the accuracy of, and accepts no responsibility for the content. Investor Daily - KCIC Pastikan Proyek KA Cepat Jadi Ajang Transfer Teknologi 19 October 2021 By Thresa Sandra Desfika Jakarta – PT Kereta Cepat Indonesia China KCIC ensures that the construction of Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway will become an event for knowledge and technology transfer among human resources in the domestic construction sector. “Since the start of the construction, this high-speed railway project has brought over many new technology and methods in the construction sector. This will automatically provide experiences and lessons for future construction planning and implementation in Indonesia,” PT KCIC President Director, Dwiyana Slamet Riyadi, said in his official statement in Jakarta on Monday 18/10. He explained that the technology and knowledge transfer from China to Indonesia through the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway project included the implementation of the cast in situ method for full-span girders. According to Dwiyana, even though the cast in situ method is a method that has been previously implemented in Indonesia, but the cast in situ method for the full-span girders in this land infrastructure project will be implemented for the first time in Indonesia. Dwiyana also ensured that the cast in situ method for the full-span girders spanning 32 metres was carried out with high quality standard that meets the conditions for high-speed railway structure design. “Cast in situ is an on-site concreting method. The cast in situ method is frequently implemented in Indonesia, but usually it is not implemented all at once. For example, the concreting is usually conducted in stages or segment by segment [not all at once]. In this high-speed railway project, the concreting is implemented all at once for the 32-metre girders. So, this is what separates it from the existing cast in situ method,” he said. In practice, Wijaya Karya WIKA as a local contractor in the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway consortium has developed the project using their experience from previous projects, and they also absorbed construction technologies and methods from Casting Yard 1 DK28 Sinohydro. With experience and knowledge from the Chinese contractor, Wijaya Karya is carrying out the development using the cast in situ method to cast the concrete all at once. Wijaya is responsible to make 137 full-span box girders for Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway. Besides that, according to him, knowledge transfer also occurred in the girder erection process in the casting yard where the precast box girders are made. Even though technology transfer does not occur directly, but, through local workforce involvement, innovative high-speed railway planning and construction can be learned. “Innovative work method in the girder erection process of the high-speed railway project will be an example of how public infrastructure construction at busy areas can be carried out without hindering public activities around the area,” Dwiyana said. Next, technology transfer also occurs in the construction of slab tracks, which are plates for the railway tracks that distribute weight from the top. The slab tracks used in this high-speed railway project are different from slab tracks used by other trains. In this project, the slab tracks do not need ballast stones along the railway tracks and require minimal maintenance. Similar to the cast in situ method, the slab tracks are constructed by involving Indonesian human resources from WIKA who have received direction and training from human resources from China from PT Sinohydro. The slab track construction is fully conducted by human resources from WIKA, where the process is conducted at the Slab Track Prefabrication Workshop in Dawuan, Purwakarta. WIKA Beton will produce 13,315 slab track units in one year from the middle of 2021 to the middle 2022. Dwiyana believes that technology and knowledge transfer during the construction of the high-speed railway can improve the capability and the experience of human resources in Indonesia in the construction sector. For the high-speed railway construction, WIKA is establishing a technology transfer team from Sinohydro, especially for tunnel and box girder construction, which will be directly involved in tunnel 1 and casting yard 1 construction. SOPs and regulations Regarding the tunnel construction, China Railway Group Limited CREC will create a guideline for the tunnel construction as part of the technology transfer to Indonesia. Simultaneously, regarding standard operational procedures SOPs and regulations regarding the high-speed railway, High-Speed Railway Contractor Consortium HSRCC and China Railway are finalising the documents that will be handed over to KCIC in October 2021. He stated that 625 SOPs, regulations, and training materials would be handed over to be used as references to create SOPs, transportation minister regulations, as well as training materials for high-speed railway workforce. “Workers from China are continuously sharing their experience and knowledge from this high-speed railway to various parties, such as professional associations and universities. Moreover, members of KAI, WIKA, and the Railway Directorate General also have opportunities to participate in field trainings at several high-speed railway project locations,” Dwiyana said. Meanwhile, the loan from China through China Development Bank CDB for Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway is 58% disbursed, or US$ billion. Moreover, the total loan from China Development Bank reaches US$ billion. “The total loan from China contributes to 75% of the funding for Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway,” PT Kereta Cepat Indonesia China KCIC Corporate Secretary, Mirza Soraya, said to Investor Daily recently. Mirza explained that, for the current high-speed railway project, his company was currently focusing on completing tunnel construction three out of ten tunnels penetrated, elevated tracks, and subgrade preparation. Basic Information Name Jakarta–Bandung High-Speed RailwayLocation Jakarta to Bandung, West Java Province, IndonesiaType of Project TransportationProject Developers PT Kereta Cepat Indonesia China KCIC, a 60–40 joint venture between a consortium of Indonesian state-owned enterprises SOEs through PT Pilar Sinergi BUMN PSBI and a consortium of Chinese SOEs through Beijing Yawan HSR Co. Ltd. PSBI comprises PT Wijaya Karya, PT Perkebunan Nusantara VIII, PT Kereta Api Indonesia, and PT Jasa Yawan HSR comprises China Railway International Co. Ltd a subsidiary of China State Railway Group Co. Ltd, CR, China Railway Group Limited known as CREC, Sinohydro Corporation Limited a subsidiary of Power Construction Corporation of China, CRRC Corporation Limited CRRC, and China Railway Signal and Communication Corporation CRSC. Main Contractors High-Speed Railway Contractor Consortium HSRCC, a consortium between Indonesian company PT Wijaya Karya 30% and several Chinese companies 70%, including China Railway International Co. Ltd, CREC, Sinohydro Corporation Limited, China Railway Design Corporation another subsidiary of CR, CRRC Sifang Co. Ltd a subsidiary of CRRC, and Financiers China Development BankCost billion USD estimate as of 2021, from an initial estimate of billion USDProject Status Under construction Project Outline The idea of a fast train project in Indonesia dates back to 2011, when the Japanese International Cooperation Agency JICA together with the Indonesian Ministry of National Development Planning Bappenas carried out a feasibility study for a possible Jakarta–Surabaya HSR, the first phase of which would connect Jakarta to Bandung. The Jakarta–Surabaya medium–high-speed railway was listed as a priority project in 2013. The original plan did not explicitly mention the Jakarta–Bandung HSR, but it suggested the Jakarta–Cirebon route via Bandung section would be prioritised in part due to its higher economic internal rate of return. However, when President Joko Widodo Jokowi came to power in 2014, he shelved the plan to build the railway and reallocated the budget to development projects outside Java. Much to the surprise of everyone, not least the Japanese, in March 2015, Jokowi asked both Japan and China to bid for the Jakarta–Bandung section of the railway. In September 2015, both countries presented their proposals, which were relatively balanced. The Japanese proposed five stations along a 140-kilometre track that is part of the Jakarta–Cirebon route, while the Chinese side planned eight stations along a 150-kilometre track. Though China had a higher interest rate of 2% compared with Japan’s China offered a longer maturity period for the loan 50 years as opposed to 40 years, a shorter time frame for completion of the project, and waived the state guarantee. After a fierce bidding war between China and Japan over the project, which China won, Indonesian Minister of State-Owned Enterprises Rini Soemarno was given a mandate to determine the fate of the railway, including the establishment of the joint-venture company to lead the project. In September 2015, a state-owned fast train consortium was formed, named PT Indonesia China Fast Train or Kereta Cepat Indonesia China, KCIC. KCIC is a consortium of Indonesian and Chinese SOEs. Indonesia is represented by PT Pilar Sinergi BUMN Indonesia PSBI, a consortium of four SOEs—namely, PT Wijaya Karya 38%, active in construction, PT Jasa Marga 12%, toll road builder, PT Kereta Api Indonesia 25%, railways, and PT Perkebunan Nusantara VIII 25%, plantations. Meanwhile, the Chinese side is represented by a consortium led by Beijing Yawan HSR Co. Ltd, which comprises China Railway International Co. Ltd, CREC, Sinohydro Corporation Limited a subsidiary of Power Construction Corporation of China, China Railway Design Corporation, CRRC Corporation Limited, and China Railway Signal & Communication Corporation. The initial deal included debt financing from the China Development Bank CDB—for 75% of the total billion USD cost—which was granted with a 10-year grace period and a 2% interest rate for the dollar-denominated loan. The remaining 25% of the project’s cost will be funded by equity provided by KCIC. After the establishment of KCIC, the railway route was revised. The train was expected to reduce the 142-kilometre trip between Jakarta and Bandung from three hours to less than 40 minutes, with a maximum speed of 350 km/h. Four main stations are planned along the route Halim East Jakarta, Karawang West Java, Walini West Java, and Tegalluar West Java. Project Developer Project Contractor Soon after the establishment of KCIC, the ground-breaking ceremony for the Jakarta–Bandung HSR was held in Walini, West Java Province, in the presence of President Jokowi, on 21 January 2016. However, the project was already embroiled in controversy, with critics expressing concerns over the risk of default and the irregularities in the concession of the building permit. Then Transport Minister Ignasius Jonan did not attend the ceremony, and instead became one of the staunchest critics of the project. On 26 January, Jonan revealed that he had not issued the railway infrastructure operation permit as his ministry was still waiting for the required documents and negotiating basic terms for the concession agreement with KCIC. Despite the lack of permits and support from key ministries and lawmakers, in late January 2016, Jokowi issued a regulation containing a list of about 200 strategic projects including the HSR, signalling the strong backing of and attention from his office for this project. Many pundits believe that by backing the project, Jokowi was attempting to build his political legitimacy, with the project connecting the two largest metropolitan areas and located in the most populated province in Indonesia, cementing Jokowi’s claim to be the country’s Infrastructure Father’. From this point of view, China’s initial commitment to complete the project before 2019 was critical to Jokowi’s government as it provided the president with political capital for his campaign for re-election that year. After several delays, including a stoppage owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, construction of the railway fell way behind schedule. As of December 2020, the project was said to be 64% complete. In April 2021, Indonesian media quoted senior management at KCIC as saying the project would be operational by the end of 2022. In May 2021, President Jokowi inspected the project during his visit to West Java Province and announced the project was 73% complete, with trial runs expected to commence at the end of 2022. Source Drawn by the author. Project Impacts Land The delay in loan disbursement was one of the main factors that impeded construction of the HSR from 2016 to 2018, due to inadequate preparation in the land acquisition According to local nongovernmental organisation NGO Indonesian Forum for the Environment Walhi, project construction has caused flooded roads, landslides, and damaged houses in part due to shoddy management and poor environmental protection procedures. As the planned route of the railway cuts through important water catchment areas, mountainous regions, and agricultural areas, the project has also impacted water supplies and caused environmental stress to the surrounding impact Due to poor preparation and multiple technical challenges, the project has incurred cost overruns. In 2017, the budget swelled from billion USD to billion USD. Economists and policymakers have questioned the viability of the project, worrying it will drag Indonesia into a debt trap. Employment and labour rights The project was expected to create 39,000 jobs—both casual and permanent—during its three-year construction phase, but no data are available to show whether this promise has been fulfilled. Meanwhile, for its operation, KCIC is set to offer 2,400 local jobs and the recruitment process was under way as of April 2021. The Jakarta–Bandung HSR has led to various concerns regarding the financial sustainability of the KCIC and Indonesian SOEs in general. With Indonesian finance accounting for a major share of total investment in the project 60%, economists and policymakers voiced concerns about whether the country was at high risk of falling into debt distress. This was especially so because the Indonesian SOEs joining the consortium are debt-heavy entities and, before the inception of KCIC, were already struggling to meet their repayment obligations. To develop these major projects, the SOEs are frontloaded with debt and will only get cash flow back years into the future, which is why delays are so costly. Some Members of Parliament called on the government to halt the project amid increased concerns that a bailout would be necessary should KCIC default on its debt. In particular, Prabowo Subianto, a challenger to Jokowi’s presidency during the 2019 general election, built his campaign on the claim that Indonesia’s economic shortfalls were due to Chinese exploitation, and he even staged a protest against the HSR. As part of the campaign, Prabowo’s team promised to renegotiate—if not cancel—the project, claiming that Indonesia must get a better deal’, given that Chinese investment had eroded national interests. During the COVID-19 pandemic, pundits and the media regularly questioned the project’s sustainability. In June 2020, the Jokowi government began discussions with Japan to join the project and suggested integrating the Chinese-built HSR with a separate Japanese-funded railway project linking Jakarta and Surabaya along a different route. Some in the Indonesian Government argued that only by integrating the two projects could they both become economically viable. However, integration would be difficult as the Japanese-built section uses a different railway gauge and speeds. The restructuring of KCIC management and the appointment of a new chief executive in March 2021 have been interpreted as clear signs of the worsening financial outlook for the company. Adding to this, the following month, Indonesian SOEs also suggested that China take up a larger stake in the project to bear the cost overrun. This remains unresolved and, according to the corporate secretary of KCIC, who was quoted by Reuters in April 2021 Until now, details regarding additional unexpected costs are still being discussed and negotiated at the shareholder level. Also, consultations between the Government of Indonesia and China are continuing.’ According to an interview conducted by the author with one human resources manager, KCIC has employed a majority of local staff in the construction of the project, but top-level management is mostly dominated by Chinese expatriates, despite the fact the Indonesian side has a 60% share in the consortium. KCIC also claimed it has provided vocational training for domestic staff and local engineers to become the first HSR technicians’ in Southeast Asia. While generating more than 2,400 job opportunities, the project has faced multiple problems and technical challenges in its construction phase. In April 2016, vendors tasked by KCIC to carry out land investigations—including five Chinese nationals—were detained by the Indonesian Air Force for trespassing at the Halim Perdanakusuma Airport. In October 2019, a construction mishap caused Indonesia’s state-owned Pertamina oil pipeline to erupt in flames. In January 2020, the breach of an embankment allegedly caused by KCIC led to flooding in the West Bandung Regency. In March 2020, flooding caused by improper landfill and waste dumping blocked the Jakarta–Cikampek toll road, which is one of the busiest routes in the greater Jakarta region. These incidents have sparked public suspicion about the quality of the project’s technical assessment, given the environmental impact assessment AMDAL was completed in just seven days before the ground-breaking ceremony, according to NGO Walhi, which has been questioning the AMDAL submitted by KCIC since early 2016. Following the recent construction mishaps and environmental degradation caused by the project, Walhi staged a series of protests demanding the Indonesian Government and KCIC reassess the project, but they have been met with no response. The project continues without any further information being made public about plans to revisit the AMDAL or actions to minimise the risks. The land acquisition process has been no less problematic. Although KCIC secured a concession for the project in April 2016, progress was slow in the first two years. The inadequate preparation of land acquisition procedures and the involvement of ill-informed Chinese companies that overlooked the complexity of landownership in Indonesia have led to many controversies. There was a tendency on the part of the Chinese companies to assume public ownership of all land, as is the case in China. Moreover, the CDB made funding conditional on Indonesia securing all the land needed for the railway, making the delay even more challenging. Acquisition of land for the project finally reached 99% in late 2019, after the Indonesian Government intervened in the process. In-Depth Sources Belt and Road Podcast. 2021. Easy Money is Rarely Easy Jessica Liao on Infrastructure Financing and Export Credit Agencies.’ Belt and Road Podcast, 21 January. Link. Camba, Alvin. 2020. Derailing development China’s railway projects and financing coalitions in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. GCI Working Paper 008. Global Development Policy Center, Boston University. Link. Friends of the Earth US. 2017. Investing in a Green Belt and Road? Assessing the Implementation of China’s Green Credit Guidelines Abroad. Washington, DC Friends of the Earth US. Link in English; Link in Chinese. Liao, Jessica C. 2020. Easy Money and Political Opportunism How China and Japan’s High-Speed Rail Competition in Indonesia Drives Financially Risky Projects.’ Panda Paw Dragon Claw, 21 December. Link. Liao, Jessica C. and Saori N. Katada. 2020. Geoeconomics, Easy Money, and Political Opportunism The Perils under China and Japan’s High-Speed Rail Competition.’ Contemporary Politics 271 1–22. Lim, Guanie, Chen Li, and Emirza Adi Syailendra. 2021. Why Is It So Hard to Push Chinese Railway Projects in Southeast Asia? The Role of Domestic Politics in Malaysia and Indonesia.’ World Development 138. Link. Salim, Wilmar and Siwage Dharma Negara. 2016. Why is the high speed rail project so important to Indonesia? ISEAS PerspectiveNo. 16. Singapore ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute. Link. Tritto, Angela. 2020. Contentious Embeddedness Chinese State Capital and the Belt and Road Initiative in Indonesia.’ Made in China Journal 51 182–87. Featured Image Credits muhammadpascalfajrin CC, on Contracts for rolling stock, systems, operation and maintenance as well as construction of the southern section of the line expected to be signed by the end of the Credit Metrolinx INFRASTRUCTURE Ontario and Metrolinx have selected the preferred consortia to deliver the rolling stock, systems, operation and maintenance RSSOM as well as the south section civils, stations and tunnel contracts for the Ontario Line metro in Toronto. The Ontario Line project is estimated to cost $C $US and is structured as a public-private partnership PPP, and will use a design-build-finance model. Connect 6ix is the preferred consortium for the RSSOM contract, which will provide a 30-year design-build-finance-operate-maintain contract for the entire Ontario Line. The group comprises Applicant lead Plenary Americas, Hitachi Rail, Webuild Group Salini Impreglio Canada Holding, Transdev CanadaDesign team Hitachi Rail, IBI Group Professional Services CanadaConstruction team Hitachi Rail, Webuild Group Astaldi Canada Design & Construction and Salini Impreglio Civil Works, NGE ContractingOperation, maintenance and rehabilitation team Hitachi Rail, Transdev Canada, andFinancial advisors National Bank Financial, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation. As part of its work, Hitachi Rail will design, supply and maintain the rolling stock for 30 years. In addition, the consortium will design, build, operate and maintain all track, communications and train control infrastructure and systems for the line, as well as design, build, operate and maintain the depot facility, the operation control centre and back-up operation control centre. NGE Group confirmed that it will supply and install the railway systems and build the depot in a joint venture with Hitachi and Webuild. Webuild says has a €450m stake in the joint venture responsible for the civil works and a 10% stake in Connect 6ix. South section contract Ontario Transit Group is the preferred consortium selected for the Ontario Line South contract, which involves a design-build-finance contract for the southern section of the line running from Exhibition/Ontario Place to the Don Yard portal, west of the Don River. The consortium consists of Applicant lead Ferrovial Construction Canada, Vinci Construction Grands ProjetsDesign team Aecom Canada, Cowi North America, GHD, Sener GroupConstruction team Ferrovial Construction Canada, Janin AtlasFinancial advisor Agentis Capital. The consortium will be responsible for excavating the 6km of tunnels as well as an above ground station that will integrate with the existing Go Transit Exhibition station, two underground stations to integrate with the existing Toronto Transit Commission TTC Osgoode and Queen metro stations, and four new stations at King/Bathurst, Queen/Spadna, Moss Park and Cooktown. The group will also oversee the groundworks required to build the tunnels and stations. Infrastructure Ontario and Metrolinx say both consortia ranked first in the evaluation of their respective request for proposals received in June 2022. Negotiations are continuing to finalise the contract ahead of awarding the contracts by the end of the year, the partners say. Procurement for the North civil major works, as well as enabling works for bridge, track and other preparatory activities, are set to follow. The Enabling Works Three package will include a new “iconic” bridge crossing the Don River Parkway and Don River. Construction on the new Exhibition station got underway earlier this year, effectively marking the start of construction on the Ontario Line, which will comprise 15 stations and will run from Exhibition Place in the west through the city centre to Ontario Science Centre in the northeast. There will be of dedicated track in existing rail corridors, of elevated track and underground. The line is expected to carry 388,000 passengers per day, with a peak frequency of a train every 90 seconds. Journey times are expected to take 40 minutes when the line opens in 2027, compared with the current 70 minutes. The Ontario Line is one of four shovel-ready public transport projects in the Greater Toronto Area GTA in which the Canadian and Ontario governments and the City of Toronto have agreed to invest a total of $C For detailed data on North American rail projects, subscribe to IRJ Pro.